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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses the concepts of ​epistemic injustice (injustice related to an individual’s             
relationship with the shared pool of social knowledge) and ​hermeneutical resources ​(conceptual            
tools, primarily based in language, that are used to understand and express lived experience) to               
examine how well a third categorical gender redresses the harms caused by the male/female              
binary. The first chapter discusses the ways medicine reproduces cultural norms regarding            
gender, focusing in particular on the resulting epistemic injustices. The second chapter looks at              
the ways the advertising and entertainment sectors of ​the culture industry (a term coined by               
Horkheimer and Adorno in 1944) distribute hermeneutical resources surrounding gender, along           
with the new resources becoming available with the emergence of a nonbinary gender category              
into the public eye. The overall argument of this thesis is that while a third gender category may                  
be beneficial to many who do not identify as male or female, it continues to perpetuate epistemic                 
injustice insofar as it upholds the discursive representation of gender as internally-generated,            
acontextual, and immutable. 
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Introduction 
On all birth certificates, passports, and driver’s licenses issued in the United States, there 
is a field for sex. The vast majority of identification documents issued by the U.S. federal 
government (as well as those issued by most state governments) permit only one of two options 
in this field: “M” (or “male”) and “F” (or “female”).  In recent years, people who do not consider 1
themselves to fall within the male/female binary have been increasingly requesting that they be 
allowed to express this on their identification documents.  Thanks to the work of queer political 2
activists, some states now allow people who do not fall within the male/female binary to amend 
certain identification documents to indicate a nonbinary identity.  As of May 2020, 18 states 3
allow nonbinary designations on driver’s licenses and ten allow for an “X” designation in lieu of 
“M” or “F” on birth certificates.  In addition to legal recognition, nonbinary identities are 4
receiving increasing recognition in mass entertainment media, demographic research, and 
medical practice. In a recent emoji keyboard update,  even Apple showed that they are on board 5
with recognizing a third gender (in emoji form, at least).  Although the advent of a third gender 6
may appear to solve the problems caused by the male/female binary, upon closer investigation, 
1 Alissa S. Kalinowski, “Compelling Agency Action: A Novel Regulatory Avenue for Correcting the Birth 
Certificates of Transgender Citizens,” ​Administrative Law Review ​70, no. 4 (Fall 2018): 973-975. 
2 Greenberg, Julie A., “Beyond the Binary: Constitutional Challenges to Male/Female Sex Classification 
Systems,” ​Thomas Jefferson Law Review ​41, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 195–196. 
3 ABC7NY. “Proposal to add X category to NYC birth certificates,” video, 21:52, streamed live from a 
press release held by Mayor Bill de Blasio and City Council Speaker Corey Johnson on June 4, 2018, posted by 
“Eyewitness News ABC7NY,” ​https://youtu.be/n2LhAPsemc0 
4 Movement Advancement Project, "Equality Maps: Identity Document Laws and Policies," accessed May 
19, 2020, ​https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/identity_document_laws  
5 Mark Davis (Google Inc.) and Peter Edberg (Apple Inc.), “Unicode® Technical Standard #51,” The 
Unicode Consortium, February 1​1, 2020, ​http://unicode.org/reports/tr51/#Modifications 
6  Paige Leskin, “Apple now offers gender-neutral versions of nearly ever [sic] human emoji, and LGBTQ 
advocates are praising the company's push toward equal representation,” Business Insider, October 31, 2019, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-iphone-emoji-gender-neutral-increases-lgbtq-representation-2019-10  
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not everyone who falls outside the male/female binary benefits equally from the emergence of 
this category. 
The term “male/female binary”​ ​was chosen for this thesis over the more commonly used 
“gender binary”​ ​to allow for fluid movement between aspects of identity discursively associated 
with sex (as a bodily attribute), sexuality (as one’s pattern of sexual behaviors and desires), and 
gender (as a culturally-based social and psychological identity). The phrase “male/female 
binary”​ ​additionally accounts for the many instances of the binary where sex and gender are ​not 
differentiated between, and are instead treated as a single entity.  Since use of the words “sex” 7
and “gender” cannot be entirely avoided, use of the word “gender”​ ​in this thesis, unless 
otherwise indicated, should be taken to ​encompass ​rather than ​oppose ​what is commonly 
considered to be sex, in addition to referring to a psychological identity and social role. Although 
sex, gender, and (hetero)sexuality are discursively separate concepts, this thesis approaches the 
three as inextricably intertwined with one another, with indeterminate borders. In order to 
investigate who does and does not benefit (and in what ways) from the expansion of the 
male/female binary into a male/female/nonbinary ternary, it is necessary to investigate the role of 
compulsory heterosexuality in cultural understandings of gender.  
The term “compulsory heterosexuality” was introduced to the feminist lexicon in a 1980 
exploratory essay by Adrienne Rich. In this essay, Rich lodged a feminist critique against the 
institution of heterosexuality with a focus on how it ignores and invalidates lesbian experience.  8
7 ​APA Dictionary of Psychology ​(2nd ed.), s.v. “Sex,” (American Psychological Association: Washington 
DC, 2015). “Sex (n): (1) the traits that distinguish between males and females. Sex refers especially to physical and 
biological traits, whereas GENDER refers especially to social or cultural traits,​ although the distinction between the 
two terms is not regularly observed​.” (Emphasis added) 
8 Adrienne Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” ​Signs ​5, no. 4 (Summer 1980): 
632. 
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She argued that “the institution of heterosexuality itself [is] a beachhead of male dominance” that 
operates through the subjugation of women.  Compulsory heterosexuality for Rich, then, refers 9
to the “cluster of forces within which women have been convinced that marriage, and sexual 
orientation toward men, are inevitable, even if unsatisfying or oppressive components of their 
lives.”  Not long after its introduction to the literature, the term gained a new significance when 10
Judith Butler exposed the ways in which the institution of heterosexuality is deeply embedded in 
the production and deployment of the male/female binary.  As Butler argued in 1988, “one way 11
in which this system of compulsory heterosexuality is reproduced and concealed is through the 
cultivation of bodies into discrete sexes with 'natural' appearances and 'natural' heterosexual 
dispositions.”   12
The process of cultivating bodies into apparently natural binary sexes is particularly 
evident in intersex treatment protocols, which often involve genital surgeries that aim, in the 
words of the President of the Societies for Pediatric Urology, Lane Palmer, “to repair serious 
functional defects or to alter their anatomy in such a way as to set it in conformance with the 
baby’s chromosomal sex.”  Even when not physically altered by surgery, intersex infants are 13
subjected to ​compulsory gendering​––or, the mandate that every person be assigned a categorical 
gender. The ​APA Dictionary of Psychology ​defines ​gender assignment ​as the “classification of 
an infant at birth as either male or female. Children born with AMBIGUOUS GENITALIA are 
9 Rich, 633. 
10 Rich, 640. 
11 For example, see Judith Butler, ​Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity​ (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 31. 
12 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory,”​ Theatre Journal ​40, no. 4 (December 1988): 524. 
13 Palmer, 147. 
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usually assigned a gender by parents or physicians.”  The practice of assigning neonates a 14
gender on their birth certificates is a driving force of compulsory gendering in the United States. 
Birth registration––including compulsory gendering––was instituted as a standardized procedure 
in all states in America in the early twentieth century.   15
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Census Bureau released requirements for 
birth registration standards in America; per these requirements, birth registration tracked 33 
categories of vital statistics, including the neonate’s sex. By 1935, all 48 states at the time (as 
well as Hawaii) had the federal birth registration standards in place.  Though the categories 16
tracked by the federal government (as well as the options offered within those categories) have 
changed over time, the general structure of birth registration––including compulsory 
gendering––has remained intact in the 120 years since they were initially put forth.  The official 17
purpose for instituting birth registration was to track demographic trends, protect public health, 
and to protect the legal rights of American citizens;  however, scholars at the Critical 18
Genealogies Collaboratory have argued that the public health concerns tracked by birth 
registration are “oriented around a set of regulations designed to normalize familial 
reproduction.”  This, paired with Palmer’s explanation that intersex surgeries “are aimed at 19
restoring the functionality of the existing anatomy to allow for proper voiding and reproduction,” 
and concern for the infant’s future “ability to safely have sex,"  implies that binary birth 20
14 ​APA Dictionary of Psychology ​(2nd ed.), s.v. “Gender Assignment,” (American Psychological 
Association: Washington DC, 2015). 
15 Critical Genealogies Collaboratory, “Standard forms of power: Biopower and sovereign power in the 
technology of the US birth certificate 1903–1935,” ​Constellations​ 25, (2018): 650-651, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12372 
16 Critical Genealogies Collaboratory, 650-51. 
17 Kalinowski, 971. 
18 Critical Genealogies Collaboratory, 646. 
19 Critical Genealogies Collaboratory, 647. 
20 Palmer, 148. 
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registration of intersex infants reinforces the normative cultural narrative of reproduction and 
heterosexual intercourse.  
The standardization of intersex medical protocols is significant for more than its ability to 
construct bodies that fit neatly into a heterosexual framework; only after large-scale medical 
integration of intersex bodies into the male/female binary could gender role and gender identity 
be conceptually separated from bodily sex.  As Bernice Hausman argued in ​Changing Sex​, the 21
separation of “sex” from “gender” would have been culturally unintelligible within the Western 
world prior to the twentieth century. This is because gender “is a concept linked to contemporary 
psychosocial conceptions of ‘role’ and ‘identity’––and as such was unthinkable for pre-twentieth 
century subjects.”  In contrast to common understandings of gender, Butler argued that gender 22
is not something that exists internally, but something that is brought into being through 
actions––and as such, “is real only to the extent that it is performed.”  This means that although 23
certain actions and bodily comportments may appear to be indicative of an internal (gendered) 
identity, they actually serve to ​create ​rather than merely ​express​ gender. In the words of Butler: 
As a consequence, gender cannot be understood as a role which either expresses 
or disguises an interior 'self,' whether that 'self' is conceived as sexed or not. As 
performance which is performative, gender is an 'act,' broadly construed, which 
constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority.  24
This means that there is no presocial gendered subjectivity that finds its expression through 
performance of a gender role; it is, rather, the performance of a gender role that constructs the 
21 Bernice Hausman, ​Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender​, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1995), 184-185. 
22 Hausman, 183-84. 
23 Butler, “Performative Acts,” 527. 
24 Butler, “Performative Acts,” 528 
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illusion of a presocial gendered subjectivity. In this way, the concepts of gender identity and 
gender role serve to reinforce the apparent stability and naturality of each other. 
In ​Visible Identities​, Linda Martín Alcoff pointed out that even if one’s gender is 
understood to be situationally contingent and internally discontinuous, this type of social identity 
is so central to how interpersonal interaction is structured and interpreted that “it only makes 
sense to say that they are fundamental to the self.”  For Alcoff, affirming the legitimacy of 25
identity to oneself and one’s experiences does ​not​ require that identity be “a stable and inherent 
feature” of one’s existence, but still allows for it to be seen as “something that is socially and 
historically contextual.”  Yet, despite a wealth of literature on the situational contingency and 26
internal discontinuity of gender identity, ​gender constancy––​which refers to the situational and 
temporal stability of gender––is, in the words of psychologists Olson and Gülgöz, “a cornerstone 
of research on gender development.”  The assumption that gender constancy is an essential 27
characteristic of a healthy gender identity has led to research that represents gender fluidity as a 
pathological, and therefore not a legitimate, experience of gender.   28
The delegitimization of fluid identities within gender development research 
disproportionately subjects gender fluid individuals to a reduction in their perceived credibility, 
which leads to their testimonies being heavily discounted on the basis of their atypical lived 
experience of gender. This represents an instance of what Miranda Fricker called ​testimonial 
25 Linda Martín Alcoff, ​Visible Identities​: ​Race, Gender, and The Self​ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 92. 
26 Alcoff, 48. 
27  Kristina R. Olson, and Selin Gülgöz, “Early Findings From the TransYouth Project: Gender 
Development in Transgender Children,” ​Child Development Perspectives ​12, no. 2 (June 2018): 95, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12268​.  
28 For example, see Lisa Littman,  “Rapid-Onset Gender Dysphoria in Adolescents and Young Adults: A 
Study of Parental Reports.” ​PLoS ONE​ 13, no. 8 (August 16, 2018), ​https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202330 
 
11 
injustice––​defined as a form of epistemic injustice wherein a person’s experiences and 
viewpoints are ignored (or prevented from being shared at all) because of an unjust reduction in 
the speaker’s credibility due to prejudice on the part of the listener.  ​Epistemic injustice​ refers to 29
the harms that occur when a person has been wronged “specifically in their capacity as a 
knower.”  As Fricker and coauthor Katherine Jenkins noted in a 2017 article, the trans  30 31
community––particularly those who do not fit the narrow, stereotyped criteria by which one’s 
trans identity is either deemed legitimate or dismissed by medical professionals––have been 
disproportionately affected by epistemic injustice.  This harms many trans individuals “either in 32
relation to what they socially ‘count’ as, and/or in relation to how they thereby even come to see 
themselves.”  33
In this thesis, I investigate how well the addition of a third gender addresses the epistemic 
injustices faced by the more marginalized members of the trans and gender nonconforming 
communities. In my investigation, I ask: How well does a ​gender ternary​––or a three-gender 
system––address the harms caused by the male/female binary? Will the discourse generated by 
the widespread recognition of a gender ternary be sufficient for all people with minority gender 
identities to be able to render their lived experiences intelligible to those who identify within the 
male/female binary? Will a gender ternary sufficiently eradicate the harm caused to the trans 
community by binary gendering practices? My main argument is that even though recognizing a 
29 Miranda Fricker, “Testimonial Injustice,” in ​Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007), 9, ​https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0002 
30 Miranda Fricker, “Introduction,” in ​Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing​ (Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2007), 1, ​http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 
31 I use the word “trans” to account for the variety of different labels used by people who misfit the sex they 
were assigned at birth, as it was used in Miranda Fricker and Katharine Jenkins, “Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and 
Trans Experiences,” in ​The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy​, eds. Ann Garry, Serene J. Khader, and 
Alison Stone (New York: Routledge, 2017), 271. 
32 Fricker & Jenkins, 272. 
33 Fricker & Jenkins, 274. 
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third gender moves toward epistemic justice for some people in the trans community, the gender 
ternary will continue to perpetuate epistemic injustice insofar as it neither challenges the practice 
of compulsory gendering nor fully addresses the hermeneutical lacuna created by the 
male/female binary. 
Method. 
With an understanding of identity as both socially instituted and corporally manifested, I 
use Linda Alcoff’s concepts of lived subjectivity and public identity (defined below), along with 
many sources from both within and outside of the disciplinary confines of philosophy, to 
evaluate how well a third categorical gender addresses epistemic injustice and gender 
identity-related harm that result from the male/female binary. I chose a multidisciplinary 
approach to this thesis in order to provide a more nuanced perspective on harms of compulsory 
gendering. Though I heavily discuss and reference sources from outside the discipline of 
philosophy, I explore these perspectives through the philosophical lens of hermeneutic 
phenomenology. 
Hermeneutics. 
The word ​hermeneutics​ comes from the ancient Greek messenger god Hermes, who 
served as a herald of the Greek gods by bringing divine truth (albeit often presented cryptically) 
to the mortal world.  Much like the mortals who wished to decipher Hermes’ message, 34
hermeneutics concerns itself with ​understanding.​ Although the kinds of understanding that are 
sought and valued varies between disciplines,  all forms of understanding are closely tied to 35
34 Niall Keane and Chris Lawn, “Introduction,” in ​The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics​, eds. Niall 
Keane and Chris Lawn (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 3-4. 
35 Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Interpretation, Judgement, Critique,” in ​The Blackwell Companion to 
Hermeneutics​, eds. Niall Keane and Chris Lawn (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 236-237. 
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language and discourse.  The reflective understanding valued in hermeneutics differs from the 36
observational understanding valued in science by virtue of its recognition of the legitimacy of 
individual subjective experiences; reflective understanding not only acknowledges, but actually 
relies on, ​the subjective differences between individuals’ experiences of the world.  Reflective 37
understanding can be achieved through a mutually collaborative and respectful dialogue  38
wherein at least one party takes up the other’s mode of discourse.  Due to differences in 39
individual experience, misunderstanding is natural and inevitable; understanding, however, is a 
purposeful endeavor.  The hermeneutic task, therefore, is to move toward a more (though never 40
fully) complete understanding.   41
Hermeneutical resources, ​as used in this paper, are the concepts and frameworks through 
which people understand their own experiences and make these experiences intelligible to others. 
Unfortunately, hermeneutical resources are primarily created for the purpose of expressing the 
experiences of the dominant social groups, which often leaves a ​hermeneutical lacuna​––or a gap 
in the shared pool of social knowledge ––with regards to minority experiences. ​Hermeneutical 42
injustice​, one of two kinds of epistemic injustice identified by Miranda Fricker,​ ​occurs when 
members of marginalized social groups are unable to render their experiences intelligible due to 
a paucity of hermeneutical resources.  This form of epistemic injustice is preceded by patterns 43
36 Donatella Di Cesare, “Understanding,” in ​The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics​, eds. Niall Keane 
and Chris Lawn (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 229. 
37 Makkreel, 236-237. 
38 David Vessey, “Dialogue, Goodwill, Community,” in ​The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics​, eds. 
Niall Keane and Chris Lawn (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 312. 
39 Di Cesare, 233. 
40 Inga Römer, “Method,” in ​The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics​, eds. Niall Keane and Chris Lawn 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 87. 
41 Di Cesare, 230. 
42 Miranda Fricker, “Hermeneutical Injustice,” in ​Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007), 13, ​https://doi.org/0.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0008 
43 Fricker & Jenkins, 268. 
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of testimonial injustice that disproportionately disallow members of certain social groups from 
contributing concepts to the shared pool of social knowledge––a condition known as 
hermeneutical marginalization.  Throughout this thesis, I explore the hermeneutical resources 44
associated with cultural recognition of a third categorical gender and attempt to uncover some of 
the hermeneutical lacunae that are ​not ​being filled by recognizing a third gender. 
Phenomenology. 
Although hermeneutics provides a helpful framework for approaching my research 
question(s), Linda Alcoff noted in the introduction of ​Visible Identities​ that “hermeneutics tends 
to underplay the embodied features of subjective experience,” suggesting that the addition of a 
phenomenological account of being sufficiently addresses the weaknesses of using a solely 
hermeneutic framework to explore gender identity.  Like Alcoff, I complement the hermeneutic 45
framework used in this thesis with phenomenological concepts such as “orientation” and “lived 
experience” to emphasize the central role of one’s body in the experience of gendered 
subjectivities. ​Orientations​, as described by Ahmed, “shape not only how we inhabit space, but 
how we apprehend this world of shared inhabitance,” ––they are the directions from which 46
embodied consciousness approaches (objects in) the world.  One’s orientation, then, 47
corresponds not only to perceptual experience, but to the physical position of one’s body in the 
world. As Alcoff described, “bodies are positioned and located by race and gender structures and 
have access to differential experiences, and may also have some differences in perceptual 
orientations and conceptual assumptions.”  48
44 Fricker & Jenkins, 268. 
45 Alcoff, 9. 
46 Ahmed, 3. 
47 Ahmed, 2. 
48 Alcoff, 114. 
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In addition to “orientation,” the phenomenological concept of “lived experience” 
provides a way to understand and account for subjective experiences that may not be easily (or at 
all) rendered through discourse. Unlike Western empirical framework, which seeks to 
differentiate the “objective world” (things-in-themselves) from the “subjective world” 
(individual sensory perceptions and mental representations),  the concept of “lived experience” 49
additionally acknowledges an objectivity that resides ​within ​human experience rather than within 
the non-human world––an objectivity that is constituted by repeatability of experience.  The use 50
of “lived experience” in this thesis draws on the phenomenological concept of ​l'expérience vécue 
explored in Franz Fanon’s chapter of ​Black Skin, White Masks​, titled “The Lived Experience of 
the Black Man” (​L'expérience vécue du Noir​). In the beginning of this chapter Fanon recognized 
that a man of color operating in the white world sees himself and his body in the third 
person--ostensibly as the white man would see him--a view that (negatively) impacts his bodily 
schema and subjective experience as a person in the world.  As other scholars in the tradition 51
have noted, lived experience and self-concept are ​not​ autonomously developed within the 
subject; rather, they are constituted by a dynamic interaction of the subject with another.  This 52
can be seen in Fanon’s discussion of failed attempts to identify himself outside of the harmful 
49 Nicholas Davey, “Lived Experience: ​Erlebnis ​and ​Erfahrung​,”in ​The Blackwell Companion to 
Hermeneutics​, eds. Niall Keane and Chris Lawn (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 326. 
50 Pol Vandevelde, “Edmund Husserl,” in ​The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics​, eds. Niall Keane and 
Chris Lawn (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 386. “Although my perspective on the Roman milestone is 
‘subjective’ because it is aspectual and depends on my position and my cultural awareness, the sense that is grasped 
by my consciousness is ‘objective’ as something that is repeatable or portable both within my conscious life—from 
one state of my consciousness to another later state when I can recall that I saw a Roman milestone— and from one 
subject to another—another hiker would see the ‘same’ Roman milestone, though from a different perspective.” 
51 Franz Fanon, “The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” in ​Black Skin, White Masks​, trans. Richard 
Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 90-91. 
52 Gail Weiss, “Phenomenology and Race (or Racializing Phenomenology),” in ​The Routledge Companion 
to Philosophy of Race​, eds. Paul C. Taylor, Linda Martin Alcoff, and Luvell Anderson (New York: Routledge, 
2018), 233. 
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stereotypes perpetuated by white society. No matter how Fanon approached the issue, his 
self-identity and lived experience proved to be heavily shaped by white society’s view of 
him––his “originality had been snatched” away, and he was forced to define himself in relation 
to the white man.  53
Much as the lived experience of the black man is formed in contrast to that of the white 
man, nonbinary trans subjectivities are formed in relation to male and female subjectivities. This 
is necessarily the case due to the available hermeneutical resources, which can only be used to 
describe gendered experience in relation to the male/female binary. Even the supposedly 
inclusive term “nonbinary” requires the male/female binary for cultural intelligibility, reinforcing 
the primacy of sexual dichotomy over all other ways of defining gender. In this thesis, I 
acknowledge the lived experiences associated with nonbinary gender identities as legitimate and 
worth attempting to understand. Rather than focusing on the ​content ​of these experiences, 
however, I explore the systems and structures that determine who is able to express lived 
experiences of identity (and who is faced with epistemic injustice). 
Identity-Related Harms. 
In this thesis, identity is taken to be discursively constructed, physically embodied, 
contextually-contingent, and most importantly, a legitimate way of understanding oneself. 
Though identity categories can be used to harm people, Linda Alcoff argued that they are also an 
important part of many, if not most, people’s existences. Per Alcoff’s account, “social identities 
are relational, contextual, and fundamental to the self.”  In ​Visible Identities, ​Alcoff identified 54
two aspects of social identity: public identity and lived subjectivity. ​Public identity ​refers to the 
53 Fanon, 107-109. 
54 Alcoff, 90. 
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aspect of identity that relates to classification systems and social perception. ​Lived subjectivity​, 
in contrast, is how we understand ourselves and the ways we reflect on our lived experiences. 
Though these may seem to reinforce the Cartesian dualism of internality/externality, Alcoff 
argued that public identity and lived subjectivity are overlapping and interrelated fields that one 
should not attempt to fully separate from one another. However, as Alcoff also noted, it is 
important to make a discursive distinction between these two aspects of identity in order to 
account for people who experience conflict between their public identity and lived subjectivity.   55
Alcoff’s division of identity into “public identity” and “lived subjectivity” is useful for 
understanding the different kinds of identity-related harms caused by hermeneutical injustice. In 
2017, Miranda Fricker and Katharine Jenkins distinguished between two particular types of 
identity-related harms that result from hermeneutical injustice: (1) harms related to how one’s 
identity is perceived socially and (2) harms related to how one understands one’s own identity.  56
I use the terms ​public identity-related harm ​and ​personal identity-related harm​, respectively, to 
describe these types of harms. 
Public identity-related harm relates to the way individuals are socially perceived, 
including “what they socially ‘count’ as” within their cultural and historical context.  57
Unfortunately, as Butler noted in ​Gender Trouble​, many gender identities do not fit within “[t]he 
cultural matrix through which gender identity has become intelligible,” because this framework 
“requires that certain kinds of ‘identities’ cannot ‘exist,’”  meaning that minority identities are 58
not merely overlooked, but ​denied legitimacy ​altogether.​ ​Even when minority gender identities 
55 Alcoff, 92-93. 
56 Fricker & Jenkins, 274-275. 
57 Fricker & Jenkins, 274 
58 Butler, ​Gender Trouble, ​17. 
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are culturally intelligible, those inhabiting them may continue to experience public 
identity-related harms insofar as they are culturally represented in a negative light. As Fricker 
and Jenkins noted: “Although the stigmatization of trans identities is surely diminishing in some 
contexts, trans people in many other contexts may still come to “count socially” as a particular 
“type” in a way that is objectionable.”  59
Personal identity-related harms, in contrast, relate to how one’s identity develops in 
relation to the presence of certain hermeneutical resources (and the absence of others). For 
example: when the available hermeneutical resources paint an unfavorable picture of one’s 
identity and experience, or perhaps provide little ability to represent one’s identity and 
experience in ​any ​culturally intelligible way, one can grow up with a damaged sense of self.  60
Fanon’s struggle to understand himself as a black man within a white world, described above, 
illustrated the ways in which hermeneutical resources developed in favor of the dominant social 
group can lead to personal identity-related harm for minorities. This is true for gender minorities 
as well as racial minorities. As Fricker and Jenkins noted, when trans people grow up with 
limited neutral or positively connoted hermeneutical resources to describe their experienced 
gender, they may develop an identity that is intertwined with self-hatred, or may even experience 
a delay in coming to identify as trans.  In this thesis, I explore the ways in which compulsory 61
gendering leads to both kinds of identity-related harms, and investigate how well a gender 
ternary addresses these harms.  
59 Fricker & Jenkins, 274 
60 Fricker & Jenkins, 275 
61 Fricker & Jenkins, 275. 
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Overview 
The body of this thesis is divided into two chapters, the first focusing on the male/female 
binary (and the introduction of a ternary) in medicine, and the second focusing on the 
male/female binary (and emerging ternary) in the culture industry. In Chapter One, I explore the 
ways in which the medical sciences reify the categories sex, gender, and sexuality both through 
discourse and through physical intervention. I first discuss the erasure of intersex bodies, which 
is executed through extensive medical interventions that often start before an intersex neonate 
leaves the hospital. These normalizing interventions continue well into childhood, and 
sometimes even into adulthood, despite evidence that genital-normalizing surgeries are both 
physically and psychologically harmful to people born intersex. In the second half of Chapter 
One, I explore how medical practices impact minority gender subjectivities. I provide an account 
of Bernice Hausman’s argument that trans subjectivities emerged from the medical-industrial 
complex and remain intimately tied to it. I then discuss the type of rhetoric historically forced 
upon trans people who desired to obtain trans specific medical treatment. At the end of this 
chapter, I give an overview of the epistemic injustices perpetuated by the continued presence of 
the male/female binary in medicine, and show that while some of these injustices appear to be in 
the process of remediation, others remain unchallenged. 
In the second chapter, I explore the influence of the culture industry in structuring and 
sustaining gendered subjectivities, as well as the epistemic injustices associated with this 
process. I open the chapter by describing the complete categorization and quantification of 
humanity by the culture industry, comparing the data generated by the culture industry to that 
generated by medical research. I then discuss the impact of audience research on gendered 
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subjectivities and introduce the concept of the double hermeneutic, showing that which genders 
are culturally intelligible within society depends on advertisers’ responses to gender differences 
that are in turn developed and shaped by the advertising companies. The effects of the double 
hermeneutic are made invisible by advertising companies’ claims that they are merely 
responding​ ​to​ ​naturally-occurring differences between men and women, denying any role in the 
process of gender creation. I then describe the identity-related harms that can result from the 
ways in which children are bombarded with gendered norms by the advertising, entertainment, 
and toy industries. I follow this with an account of the role of media in the development and 
perpetuation of harmful binary gender ideals––including the normalization, or perhaps 
glorification​, of cosmetic surgery to fix imperfections in female gender presentation. I then 
explore the role of entertainment and news media in the rise of homonormativity and 
transnormativity, which together serve to deradicalize much of LGBT existence. At the end of 
this chapter I explore the ways in which nonbinary has ​already ​been enfolded into a 
homonormative culture, and the ways in which the emerging homonormative stereotypes 
associated with nonbinary identities continue to perpetuate epistemic injustice by presenting a 
narrow view of what it means to identify outside of the male/female binary. 
Overall in this paper, I argue that while the recognition of a third gender category in 
America allows for hermeneutical resources to be redistributed in a way that will reduce the 
prevalence of epistemic injustice for many of those outside the male/female binary, it still 
perpetuates epistemic injustice for many others by continuing the restrictive practice of top-down 
gender categorization without addressing the hermeneutical lacunae this practice creates.  
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Chapter 1 
Medicine 
By the mid-twentieth century, medical technology advanced to the point where the 
physiology of intersex bodies could be altered such that they could neatly be called “male” or 
“female.” These advancements set the conditions for gender to emerge as discursively distinct 
from sex, which in turn gave rise to the cultural intelligibility of people whose experienced 
gender(s) does not match their assigned sex. This coincided with the emergence of what Bernice 
Hausman called ​transsexual subjectivities​––or, the lived experiences associated with having 
undergone hormonal or surgical intervention as part of a gender transition process ––which are 62
produced and regulated by the same sets of medical discourse that reify the male/female binary. 
Though discourse heavily shapes cultural understandings and experiences of sex, 
biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling emphasized that: “As we grow and develop, we literally, not just 
‘discursively’ (that is, through language and cultural practices), construct our bodies, 
incorporating experience into our very flesh."  Bodies are more than mere concepts created by 63
language, as Sara Ahmed also noted in ​Queer Phenomenology​; they are the point from which 
one’s consciousness is oriented toward the world.  As such, transsexual  medical interventions 64 65
and associated discourse do more than merely ​correct ​one’s body so that it appropriately 
corresponds to a (purportedly) pre-existing orientation––they ​bring into being​ new orientations. 
Gender transition protocols use gender identity to dictate the physiological characteristics to be 
62 Hausman, 107. 
63 Fausto-Sterling, 20. 
64 Sara Ahmed, ​Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others​ (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2007), 52-53. 
65 In this thesis, the word ​transsexual ​is used to describe procedures and experiences associated with 
medically transitioning. 
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embodied by the trans subject. By medically crafting a body that is purported to correspond to an 
internally-experienced (and ostensibly unchanging) identity, trans people and their physicians 
affirm temporal and cross-situational fixity of the corresponding gender identity.   66
The medical affirmation of the immutability of gender can cause ​both​ personal ​and 
public identity-related harms for the many people who do not experience gender in this way. 
Under Alcoff’s account: “Identities themselves—meaning not the mere representation but the 
lived bodies—are fluid, complex, open-ended, and dynamic, which is why reductive and overly 
homogeneous characterizations of identity are inaccurate.”  Gender, as an embodied identity, is 67
also complex, contingent, and without clear borders. Despite this, the culturally available 
hermeneutical resources to describe gender tend to privilege narratives of temporal and 
situational stability while ignoring, discounting, or even pathologizing experiences of gender that 
change over time. Since the established medical framework does not leave room for fluid 
conceptions of identity, people with gender-fluid experiences disproportionately face 
hermeneutical injustice when attempting to express their lived experience of gender.  
In addition to concealing the existence of gender fluidity, hermeneutical resources 
developed in relation to the male/female binary (including the descriptor “nonbinary”) do little to 
combat the epistemic injustice faced by those who do not wish––or perhaps even do not know 
how––to define their sex, gender, and/or sexuality in relation to the male/female binary. As 
Alcoff noted, "identities are constantly used to lend or withhold credence from participants in 
almost any public exchange.”  Within a framework that privileges the male/female binary, both 68
66 Hausman, 188-89. 
67 Alcoff, 112. 
68 Alcoff, 24. 
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those who are born intersex and those who later come to identify outside the binary are faced 
with reduced credibility due to the unintelligibility of their subject position.  
Erasing Intersex. 
The reduced cultural intelligibility of experiences that fall outside of (compared to those 
that fall within) the male/female binary is largely related to medical erasure of atypically sexed 
bodies. Since the 1950s, surgeons have routinely operated on intersex infants to fashion 
socially-acceptable genitals that can be neatly described as male or female.  Some of these 69
infants are additionally labeled as having an endocrine disorder and are later treated with 
medications that alter hormone levels.  Contemporary medical protocols to address 70
intersexuality often physically, as well as socially, integrate the bodies of intersex infants into the 
male/female binary. Proponents of surgical intervention in intersex newborns often argue that it 
is damaging to a child’s psyche to grow up without a clear male or female gender. For instance, 
the President of the Societies for Pediatric Urology has argued that postponing surgery until a 
child is old enough to consent would have the effect of unfairly and unnecessarily forcing the 
child to grow up transgender.  On the other hand, intersex advocates have argued that it is more 71
damaging to a child’s psyche for them to grow up believing that their natural sex characteristics 
are unacceptable––possibly even unrecognizable as human––without surgical intervention than it 
is for them to grow up intersex.  Yet, these operations are generally considered to be highly 72
69Ellen K. Feder, "Atypical Bodies in Medical Care,” in ​The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of 
Medicine​, eds. Mirium Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon, and Harold Kincaid (New York: Routledge, 2017), 438. 
70 Lane Palmer, “The Push to Ban Intersex Medical Intervention,” ​Urologic Nursing​ 39, no. 3 (May 2019): 
148, ​https://doi.org/10.7257/1053-816X.2019.39.3.147  
71 Palmer, 149. 
72 M. Morgan Holmes, “Mind the Gaps: Intersex and (Re-productive) Spaces in Disability Studies and 
Bioethics,”  in ​Bioethical Inquiry​ 5 (April 2008): 170, ​https://doi.org/​10.1007/s11673-007-9073-2 
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successful in the eyes of the doctors who oversee them, and these doctors claim high long-term 
patient satisfaction as well.   73
The costs of routinely integrating intersex individuals into the male/female binary are 
manyfold. For one, these medical procedures allow the US government to require that citizens 
are clearly designated as male or female on federal identification documents, which precludes 
people (even those born intersex) who identify outside the male/female binary from easily being 
legally recognized as such.  These procedures also allow for human subjects research on 74
categorical sex differences, which further reifies the male/female binary both within medicine 
and within Western culture more generally. Perhaps most concerningly of all, as discussed 
above, are the messages these medical interventions send to intersex patients. As intersex 
advocate M. Morgan Holmes pointed out in an article published in ​Bioethical Inquiry​:​ ​"The 
clinical standards of care for intersex assert that only through treatment to erase their ambiguous 
traits can the intersexed become fully human with the capacity for development as persons."  75
Finally, protocols for assigning sex to those born outside the male/female binary limit discourse 
surrounding intersex, which in turn leaves people with minority gender identities fewer resources 
with which to intelligibly represent their lived experience. 
The Invention of Gender. 
The discursive separation of “gender” from “sex” can be traced to physician John Money 
in the mid-twentieth century.  Money believed that in order to live a meaningful life, people 76
need to have a stable sense of (binary) gender identity; when he declared that gender had no 
73 Palmer, 148-149. 
74 Greenberg, 198. 
75 Holmes, 173. 
76 Anne Fausto-Sterling, ​Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Identity​ (New York: 
Basic Books, 2000), 4. 
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physiological basis, he didn’t seek to eradicate gender, he sought to better perpetuate it.  The 77
work of Money and associates marked a transition from a medical norm of determining (through 
various analyses of gonads, reproductive organs, genitals, hormones, and disposition) a person’s 
“true sex” to a medical norm of choosing the “best sex” for a person.  Rather than concerning 78
themselves with reproductive capacity (as indicated by gonads), physicians began concerning 
themselves primarily with phallus size and making surgical decisions based on whether the 
infants’ phallus sufficiently resembled that of a natal male (and thus could engage in 
heterosexual intercourse with a female).  In Anne Fausto-Sterling’s words, the goal of intersex 79
protocols designed by John Money and associates “was to assure proper psychosexual 
development by assigning the young mixed-sex child to the proper gender and then doing 
whatever was necessary to assure that the child and h/her parents believed in the sex 
assignment.”  The writings of John Money express an assumption that gender bifurcates (or 80
“differentiates”) into one of two fixed identities that remains constant into and throughout 
adulthood.  For Money, as Bernice Hausman explained, “if you aren’t born into a sex, you can 81
always become one through being a gender.”  82
The concept of gender provided a way to reaffirm the male/female binary after it became 
evident that there was no single, infallible indicator of sex category.  The emergence of 83
hermeneutical resources that represent gender as an identity allowed physicians to continue 
practicing medicine under the pretense of a male/female binary––even those physicians who 
77 Fausto-Sterling, 46. 
78 Hausman, 79. 
79 Hausman, 73. 
80 Fausto-Sterling, 46. 
81 Hausman, 105. 
82 Hausman, 107. 
83 Hausman, 191. 
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routinely worked with individuals whose bodies did not fit this binary. The model of gender that 
views “male” and “female” as predetermined categories is called ​categorical theory​.  Though 84
categorical theory can help to address social inequalities that occur on the basis of gender, it 
leaves little room for gender diversity, intersectional analyses of gender (i.e. contextualizing 
gender by including additional axes of identity, such as race, (dis)ability or economic class), or 
the possibility that gender is not an inherent aspect of identity.   85
Another danger of categorical theory is its potential to cause categorization threat. 
Categorization threat​, as described by Clair et al. in 2019, “occur[s] when individuals perceive 
that they are categorized into irrelevant and undesired demographic groups."  In this way, 86
categorization threat is a hermeneutical injustice that can result in public identity-related harm 
through nonrecognition of an employee’s demographic identity. Although the concept of 
categorization threat originated within organizational and management studies, when it is taken 
out of the context of individual organizations and applied to categorical theory writ large, 
categorization threat provides a useful tool for exploring the problems with compulsory 
gendering. Compulsory gendering can cause categorization threat because it is done by way of 
top-down categorization​––where everyone is categorized into a limited set of predetermined 
options that purport to capture all identities.  But depending on the groupings within a given 87
category, the options people are provided with often do not reflect the diverse identities of all 
84 Raewyn Connell, “Masculinities: The Field of Knowledge,” in​ Configuring Masculinity in Theory and 
Literary Practice​, ed. Stefan Horlacher, DQR Studies in Literature (The Netherlands: Brill, 2015), 41, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004299009_004  
85 Connell, 40. 
86 Judith A. Clair, Beth K. Humberd, Elizabeth D. Rouse, and Elise B. Jones, “Loosening Categorical 
Thinking: Extending the Terrain of Theory and Research on Demographic Identities in Organizations,” ​Academy of 
Management Review​ 44, no. 3 (July 2019): 594. 
87 Clair, 606. 
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those who are subject to categorization. Top-down binary male/female categorization in 
medicine causes harm by both naturalizing the male/female binary, and obscuring anyone who 
does not fall within the male/female binary (by precluding these individuals from accurately 
reporting their identity).  
Erasing Intersex in Human Subjects Research. 
Working within a categorical theory model of gender, medicine operates under a pretense 
of binary sex difference for both research and clinical protocols,  couching the male/female 88
binary in a rhetoric of empiricism and objectivity. In Blackwell’s ​A Companion to Epistemology​, 
Wesley Salmon wrote that "The natural sciences (physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, 
biology) are of special importance to epistemology because collectively they contain the most 
extensive, systematic, reliable knowledge that we have."  This means that when the sciences 89
purport a difference between males and females, these claims are presented as objective truths 
and can be very difficult to disrupt. 
Within research context, top-down male/female categorization makes it possible to study 
sex differences.  Use of sex as a category of analysis in biomedical research has yielded 90
important findings that have saved women’s lives, such as those revealing the sex differences in 
the symptomology of cardiovascular disorders.  But even when differences between men and 91
women are found through top-down male/female categorization, these differences are of little 
88 Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann, "Gender in Medicine," in ​The Routledge Companion 
to the Philosophy of Medicine​, eds. Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon, and Harold Kincaid, (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), 408-9. 
89 Wesley C. Salmon, “Natural Science, Epistemology of,” in ​A Companion to Epistemology, ​2nd ed., eds. 
Jonagthan Darcy, Ernest Sos, and Matthias Steup (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 2010), 538. 
90 de Melo-Martín & Intemann, 408-9. 
91 de Melo-Martín & Intemann, 411-12. 
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clinical relevance to those––such as some trans and intersex people––whose bodies cannot be 
neatly described as male or female.  
The harm of ignoring these groups in research is plainly evidenced by significant health 
disparities between people who identify within the male/female binary and people who do not. A 
recent nation-wide gender-inclusive demographic survey about population health showed that 
people who do not identify within male/female binary are ​nearly​ ​twice as likely​ to report poor 
health as cisgender men and women.  Even after controlling for risk factors such as a smoking 92
and socioeconomic status, gender nonconforming survey respondents were significantly more 
likely to report poor health than cisgender respondents.  Just as women were harmed when past 93
research that focused exclusively on males, people who do not identify as male or female are 
harmed by the current human subjects research norm of analyzing sex differences as a binary. 
Trans Medicalization and Embodied Experience. 
Medical standards for transsexual transitions arose directly out of intersex treatment 
protocols in the mid-to-late 20th century. Not long after standardized medical procedures for 
treatment of intersexuality became widely available, the first transsexual medical transitions––all 
male-to-female––were initiated.  At first, very few individuals were able to receive sex-altering 94
treatments (whether surgical or hormonal), with treatment plans developed on a case-by-case 
basis. But as these treatment plans became more common, standards for transsexual medical 
treatment began to emerge. These standards were highly informed by gender stereotypes. The 
surgeons and endocrinologists who provided transsexual treatments served as gatekeepers for 
92 Lagos, Danya. “Looking at Population Health beyond ‘Male’ and ‘Female’: Implications of Transgender 
Identity and Gender Nonconformity for Population Health.” ​Demography​ 55, no. 6 (December 2018):  2108-2111, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-018-0714-3  
93 Lagos, 2110-2111. 
94 Hausman, 1-2. 
 
29 
who was able to medically transition, and the only people allowed to pass through the gate were 
those who fit the doctors’ preconceived notions about what constitutes a man or a woman.  95
As Hausman noted: “Ways of seeing the body, ways of encoding anatomy and 
physiology into the language of medicine, have a significant impact on imagined and imaginable 
forms of subjectivity.”  This means that hermeneutical resources developed within the medical 96
domain provide structure to lived experience and delineate possible subjectivities. Since, as 
Miranda Fricker and Katherine Jenkins have noted, it was cisgender clinicians––not trans 
people––who dictated the way trans bodies were encoded into the language of medicine, the 
resulting vocabulary proved quite ill-suited to describing the lived experience of many trans 
people.  Despite this, trans people are often forced to rely on medicalized terms to render their 97
lived experiences culturally intelligible. Given the limitations of medical language, trans people 
often struggle to find the appropriate language with which to describe how they experience 
gender, often resulting in hermeneutical injustice. Additionally, even when trans people ​are ​able 
to express aspects of their experience that do not fit into the standard medical model, their 
experiences are often ignored, rejected, or sometimes even completely silenced by testimonial 
injustice.  98
In recent years, people have been transitioning to gender identities outside of the 
male/female binary in increasing numbers.  Healthcare services such as Planned Parenthood 99
now affirm patient autonomy in transsexual treatment protocols by offering informed consent 
95 Fricker & Jenkins, 272. 
96 Hausman, 176. 
97 Fricker & Jenkins, 273. 
98 Fricker & Jenkins, 273. 
99 Ian T. Nolan, Christopher J. Kuhner, & Geolani W. Dy, “Demographic and Temporal Trends in 
Transgender Identities and Gender Confirming Surgery,” ​Translational Andrology and Urology​ 8, no. 3 (June 
2019): 185, ​https://doi.org/10.21037/tau.2019.04.09  
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treatment models for hormone replacement therapy (HRT), allowing for easy access to 
transsexual medical treatment. Informed consent refers to the process where patients, rather than 
physicians, determine whether HRT is a good fit.  As of 2019, around 9% of Americans who 100
live as nonbinary elect to have surgery as part of their transition process.  It is by way of 101
procedures such as these that, as Alcoff noted: “Sexed identity has undergone major cultural 
transformation, and there is no sign that this process will soon stop.”   102
Though the increasing prevalence of transsexual interventions poses a powerful challenge 
to social belief in the ontological reality of the male/female binary, these interventions also 
continue to perpetuate the contentious connection between trans identity and the medical 
complex. As Hausman convincingly showed, historical emergence of transsexual subjectivities is 
necessarily tied to medical interventions, and medical intervention continues to remain a 
significant part of the transition process.  ​Trans piecing​, as described by Jasbir Puar, is the way 103
that trans people strategically position certain parts of their bodies to serve a specific purpose 
(e.g. qualify for medical intervention, to legitimate their trans identity, etc.).  This means that 104
rather than ​challenging ​trans medicalization, trans piecing is done in ​cooperation ​with it. The 
practices associated with trans piecing show just how intimately intertwined trans subjectivities 
are, not only with the medicalization of bodies, but also with the culturally-compelled 
segmentation and exploitation of individual body parts. Despite efforts from certain parts of the 
trans community to demedicalize, trans subjectivities will, per Hausman’s account, remain 
100 Campaign for Southern Equality, "Trans in the South: A Guide to Resources and Services," October 
2017, 4, ​https://southernequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/TransintheSouth_October2017.pdf  
101 Nolan, 185. 
102 Alcoff, 159. 
103 Hausman, 199-200. 
104 Jasbir Puar, “Bodies with New Organs: Becoming Trans, Becoming Disabled,” in ​Right To Maim: 
Debility, Capacity, Disability​, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 36. 
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intimately associated with the medical domain for as long as those transitioning demand access 
to risky medical interventions––such as hormones and surgeries––that require professional 
medical care to administer safely.   105
Addressing Epistemic Injustice. 
As I have shown so far in this chapter, medical reliance on the male/female binary gives 
rise to a variety of epistemic injustices and identity-related harms. The question now is: how well 
does a third categorical gender address these harms and injustices? The hermeneutical resources 
that accompany the male/female/nonbinary ternary undoubtedly benefit, in one way or another, 
the vast majority of trans and gender nonconforming Americans. However, the benefit conferred 
by these new resources is not equally distributed throughout these communities, and individuals 
who benefit in some way from a third categorical gender may also continue to be harmed in 
other, potentially more profound, ways by this gendering system. The hermeneutical lacunae still 
remaining in a male/female/nonbinary ternary can only be redressed after they have been 
identified. Although it is only by acknowledging the epistemic injustices perpetuated by a third 
categorical gender that one can begin to hear (if only faintly) the previously silenced voices of 
those who remain in the margins, it is also imperative not to downplay the injustices rectified by 
a third category. The social changes associated with widespread recognition of a “nonbinary” 
gender category are overwhelmingly positive, and to discuss associated harms without also 
accounting for benefits would be to ignore the lived experiences of the many trans people who 
have been positively impacted by the introduction of a third categorical gender. 
105 Hausman, 199. 
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Degendering Pregnancy. 
The cultural belief that the creation of human babies requires both a mother and father 
has long been under threat by the rapid advances in assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), 
which give individuals unprecedented control over their reproductive capacity. As Alcoff noted 
in 2006: 
[S]upport for the denaturalizing of sex has come about through the new 
reproductive technologies. Artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo 
transfer, fertility enhancements, and surrogacy are creating new options in the 
biological process of reproduction, challenging the belief that there is a necessary 
connection between reproduction and heterosexuality and producing a 
proliferation of legally recognized reproductive roles, from surrogate, to birth 
mother, to egg donor, sperm donor, and so on.  106
 
For decades now, babies have been created and born without the need for heterosexual 
intercourse, and it is no accident that advances in ARTs have coincided with increased medical 
access to transsexual treatments. In fact, there are ARTs specifically designed to preserve the 
reproductive capacity of trans patients undergoing HRT.  This allows for babies to be born with 107
biological parents who are the same sex as each other at the time of the baby’s birth.  The new 108
landscape of reproduction, as these examples show, no longer requires a “man” and a “woman” 
to create a baby.  
As of the 2010s, there were limited hermeneutical resources with which to discuss 
pregnancy outside the confines of the male/female binary. However, this has quickly been 
changing as activists have been pushing to degender the language used to describe pregnancy.  109
106 Alcoff, 159-160. 
107 Theo Erbenius and Jenny Gunnarsson Payne, “Unlearning Cisnormativity in the Clinic: Enacting 
Transgender Reproductive Rights in Everyday Patient Encounters.” ​Journal of International Women’s Studies​ 20, 
no. 1 (December 2018): 27–39. 
108 Reiss Smith, "A trans woman conceived a baby with her wife while she was transitioning,"​ PinkNews​, 
September 16, 2019, ​https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2019/09/16/trans-woman-baby-pregnant-wife/ 
109 Erbenius & Payne, 33. 
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Degendering,​ as defined by Saguy and Williams, refers to the process by which “gender is 
deemphasized” by replacing gendered terms with non-gendered replacements--the authors 
provide the example of “husband” and “wife” being changed to “Spouse 1” and “Spouse 2” on 
marriage certificates following federal recognition of same-sex marriage.  When trans men and 110
nonbinary individuals present to a fertility clinic, doctors and staff are often unsure of how to 
address them, and may default to inappropriately gendered language. However, these same 
doctors and staff also expressed a desire to learn less discriminatory language so as to make the 
fertility clinic more accommodating for trans people.  This can be taken as evidence that the 111
increasing testimonial justice for trans people (i.e. where people listen to and consider what trans 
people have to say) bodes positively for the creation and dissemination of trans-inclusive 
hermeneutical resources. Although these resources are not yet widely distributed, the existence 
of gender-neutral pregnancy language and the willingness of clinicians to take up this language 
signal a closing of the hermeneutical lacuna surrounding trans pregnancies. 
Gender-Inclusive Research. 
As I argued earlier in this chapter, human subjects research, in cooperation with medical 
protocols, erases sexual diversity (at the expense of health outcomes for nonbinary individuals) 
by force-fitting everyone under a “male” or “female” label, and then performing all other 
research and clinical procedures on the basis of this label. Though tracking sex-related variables 
in human subjects research is useful for identifying trends and comparing groups, top-down 
male/female categorization forces people who do not identify within the male/female binary to 
choose between two identities that do not adequately express their lived experience or 
110 Abigail C. Saguy and Juliet A. Williams, “Reimagining Gender: Gender Neutrality in the News,” ​Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture & Society​ 44, no. 2 (Winter 2019): 469, ​https://doi.org/10.1086/699369  
111 Erbenius & Payne, 31. 
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self-identification, often resulting in categorization threat. If participants refuse to indicate 
themselves to be either male or female, as Clair et al. noted, this may result in their data being 
excluded from analysis.   112
Though top-down demographic categorization helps to streamline data analysis, it also 
drastically increases instances of categorization threat by assuming that everyone has a static 
identity that fits neatly into the given demographic groups.   Systems of top-down gender 113
categorization, even with an extensive array of options, are bound to miss ​some ​gender identities 
due to the rapidly changing gender landscape of the 21st century. In order to encourage 
recognition of nonnormative demographic identities in research, Clair et al. recommended using 
a bottom-up structure for categorization. ​Bottom-up categorization​ allows participants to 
self-define–-or not define at all, if they so wish––through open-ended responses rather than 
forced-choice options. Bottom-up demographic categorization is a dynamic process that allows 
for the emergence of identity groups that best reflect the lived experience of those being 
surveyed.  Unfortunately, bottom-up demographic measures may not result in neatly divided 114
groups to use in analysis, and so they can be difficult to utilize in quantitative research. Even 
when implemented, bottom-up measures often ignore the situational contingency of gender, 
instead assuming that gender is experienced as unchanging and internally-generated. Rarely, if 
ever, do study demographics ask about ​when ​a person feels to be a certain gender, thereby 
denying the legitimacy of fluid gender experiences. This bias is implicit in the majority of gender 
categorization systems and will likely continue well into the standardization of a third gender 
112 Clair et al., 608. 
113 Clair et al., 606. 
114 Clair et al., 606. 
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category, leaving intact the hermeneutical lacuna that covers over the contextually-contingent, 
discontinuous qualities of gender.  
Summary. 
In this chapter, I described the ways in which medical reliance on the male/female binary 
leads to epistemic injustice and identity-related harms for minority genders. Additionally, I 
showed that although the introduction of a third gender category is bringing (and will continue to 
bring) forth new hermeneutical resources with which to conceptualize and linguistically 
represent gendered experience, it does not encourage the cultural uptake of hermeneutical 
resources that recognize the contextually contingent nature of gender. Further, a third gender 
does not challenge the dualism of the sex/gender divide insofar as gender continues to be 
discursively separated from bodily sex characteristics. Altogether, while a third gender 
acknowledges (some) experiences outside the male/female binary, many people with identities 
that do not neatly fit the male/female/nonbinary gender ternary will still face epistemic injustice 
due to continued bias of hermeneutical resources toward an interpretation of gender as 
internally-generated and self-identical throughout one’s life.   
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Chapter 2 
The Culture Industry 
In the industrialized West, people’s self-views are heavily shaped by what Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno called​ the culture industry​––the intertwining branches of 
social and economic influence that standardize human experience through the practice of 
classifying humanity (and the rest of the observable world) into groups.  In “The Culture 115
Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” Horkheimer and Adorno described the way in 
which Western culture, as an industry, dominates and controls every aspect of consumers’ lives 
by creating a small number of discrete interest groups under which all individual differences are 
subsumed. “The identity of the category forbids that of the individual cases,” Horkheimer and 
Adorno wrote, “[n]ow any person signifies only those attributes by which he can replace 
everybody else: he is interchangeable, a copy. As an individual he is completely expendable and 
utterly insignificant.”  The culture industry, therefore, is only interested in the individual 116
insofar as the individual’s experiences are reflective of their group membership. As such, the 
culture industry is central to the creation and maintenance of normative identity categories in 
Western society. 
As described by Horkheimer and Adorno: “Consumers appear as statistics on research 
organization charts, and are divided by income groups into red, green, and blue areas; the 
technique is that used for any type of propaganda.”  Product marketing creates and targets 117
specific classes of consumers, tracking and responding to identities insofar as the identities are 
115 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” 
trans. John Cumming, in ​The Continental Philosophy of Film Reader, ​ed. Joseph Westfall (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2018), 245-46. 
116 Horkheimer & Adorno, 258. 
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deemed useful. “Something is provided for all so that none may escape,” wrote Horkheimer and 
Adorno, “[t]he public is catered for with a hierarchical range of mass-produced products of 
varying quality, thus advancing the rule of complete quantification.”  This “rule of complete 118
quantification” collapses the unbounded complexity of the individual into a single data point that 
is only intelligible in relation to other data points.  
Described by Horkheimer and Adorno as “those who serve up the data of experience,”  119
the culture industry categorizes and quantifies existence, discarding the qualitative aspects of 
experience and validating only that which can be numerically rendered. In this respect, the 
medical and culture industries are quite similar––they treat the individual not as a person with 
valuable experiences that are worth listening to, but as an object to be studied and manipulated. 
Unlike medicine, however, the data collected by the culture industry are not meant to produce 
objective knowledge––rather, they are meant to be strategically deployed for the benefit of 
producers and advertisers.  
The Double Hermeneutic of The Culture Industry. 
Double hermeneutic​ refers to the dynamic exchange between social science researchers 
and the populations being researched, wherein each adjusts their own practices in relation to 
information they receive from the other.  In the current climate of twenty-first century big data, 120
the concept of the double hermeneutic helps to elucidate the processes by which both the public 
and personal identities co-produced with the culture industry shift and change over time. As 
Klaus Jensen argued: “audience researchers perform a constitutive role in the structuration of 
118 Horkheimer & Adorno, 245. 
119 Horkheimer & Adorno, 246. 
120 Klaus Bruhn Jensen, “The Double Hermeneutics of Audience Research,” ​Television & New Media ​20, 
no. 2 (February 2019): 144, ​https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476418811103 
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culture and society.”  The enormous profitability of big data means that audience engagement 121
with mass entertainment media in the twenty-first century constitutes labor just as much as it 
does consumption.  However, the double hermeneutic of mass media is not new to recent 122
decades––it has been around since the dawn of the culture industry. Horkheimer and Adorno 
stated: “The attitude of the public, which ostensibly and actually favors the system of the culture 
industry, is a part of the system and not an excuse for it.”  Though not explicitly called such by 123
the authors, the feedback loop between producers and consumers of mass entertainment media 
described in “The Culture Industry” constitutes a double hermeneutic.  
Whether or not co-produced identity categories (i.e. categories produced in conversation 
with the individuals they are imposed upon) would better capture human diversity than those 
imposed from the top-down, the reality of mass entertainment media and associated research 
suggests that top-down categorization has proven more profitable. As Linda Alcoff has pointed 
out, social identities such as gender are grounded in the structural power relationships that 
constitute capitalism. As she said in the Preface of ​Visible Identities​: 
[...] structural power relations such as those created by global capital are determinate over 
the meanings of our identities, the possibilities of social interaction, and the formations of 
difference. Nonetheless, the focal point of power most often today operates precisely 
through the very personal sphere of our visible social identities.  124
Identities––gender and race, in particular––serve to stratify workers and consumers into different 
classes. Those classified are then subjected to unequal treatment on the basis of the imposed 
stratification. 
121 Jensen, 151. 
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Since the double hermeneutic of mass entertainment media only allows for ​indirect ​(and 
often unknowing) contributions from consumers, it resembles a guess-and-check style of 
top-down categorization; the identities imposed on consumers are not determined by the 
consumers themselves, but are instead those identities that prove the most profitable. Despite 
this, companies pushing advertisements that perpetuate harmful gender stereotypes claim that 
they are merely responding to consumers’ interests in a neutral, or even ​beneficial​, way.  This 125
shows a continuation of the trends Horkheimer and Adorno observed in the culture industry in 
1947: “The stronger the positions of the culture industry become, the more summarily it can deal 
with consumers’ needs, producing them, controlling them, disciplining them, and even 
withdrawing amusement: no limits are set to the cultural progress of this kind.”  Adorno and 126
Horkheimer also noted that “it is claimed that standards were based in the first place on 
consumers’ needs, and for that reason were accepted with so little resistance.”  Taken together, 127
this means that while the culture industry purports to be merely ​responding​ to consumer’s needs, 
it is actually ​creating​ them. 
Gender in Children’s Media. 
From a very young age, children in America and Europe are subjected to advertising 
ploys that rely on and perpetuate harmful gender norms and stereotypes.  Gender stereotypes 128
used in toy marketing are so salient that by age two or three––well before most can read 
words––children raised in the global West can use coloring, shape, and object presentation to 
125 Cordelia Fine and Emma Rush. “‘Why Does All the Girls Have to Buy Pink Stuff?’ The Ethics and 
Science of the Gendered Toy Marketing Debate.” ​Journal of Business Ethics ​149, no. 4 (June 2018): 774, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3080-3  
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read the genders communicated by toy packaging.  Since advertising along the lines of the 129
male/female binary has proven quite profitable for children’s toy companies, widespread parental 
disapproval of gendered toy marketing strategies may be needed before many toy companies will 
view gender-neutral marketing alternatives to be worth pursuing.  Because the male/female 130
binary has proven so lucrative in the business of marketing to children, some contend that 
commercial children's entertainment media are unlikely to challenge it for fear of losing support 
from advertisers.  The imbalance in influence when it comes to gendered toy marketing is 131
reflective of the mass entertainment double hermeneutic as a whole; while both producers and 
consumers of entertainment media have influence over the narratives and associated identities 
presented, this influence is heavily weighted against consumers and in favor of the producers. 
Therefore, it appears that even though mass entertainment media play a large role in the cultural 
salience of the male/female binary, the entertainment industry is able to use the presence of a 
double hermeneutic to deny the vast majority of their responsibility.  132
In addition to binary gendered advertising schemes, American children also grow up 
watching TV and movies, as well as reading books, that continue to perpetuate binary gender 
divisions and associated stereotypes. In an article about representations of gender 
non-conformity in child-geared entertainment media, Tony Kelso observed: “The media vehicle 
that has consistently delivered the most positive portrayals—and has included 
[gender-nonconforming characters] most often—is the children’s picture book.”  But as Kelso 133
129 Fine & Rush, 777. 
130 Fine & Rush, 780. 
131 Tony Kelso, “Still Trapped in the U.S. Media’s Closet: Representations of Gender-Variant, 
Pre-Adolescent Children,”​ Journal of Homosexuality​ 62, no. 8 (August 2015): 1086, 
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also observed, television has a stronger sway over young children than print media, yet is one of 
the media where gender-variant children are least represented. This leaves the children whom 
Kelso dubs “gender-creative” with few characters who have gender expressions they can identify 
with. Additionally, most of the representations of gender-nonconforming children in television 
are from news stories and talk shows that “inevitably either have underscored only the most 
extreme cases of kids whose gender identifications betray their bodies or have focused on 
gender-variant children marked by years of suffering.”  This leaves very few representations of 134
“[g]ender-creative youth who feel comfortable with their biological sex or lead emotionally 
satisfying lives,” with which gender-nonconforming children can identify.   135
As described above, the vast majority of the gendered images in children’s media 
stereotypically conform to the male/female binary, and the few instances of 
gender-nonconforming children in other entertainment and news media tend to present these 
children as highly distressed. This means that children (as well as adults) are inundated with 
images that clearly link gender-normativity with happiness and gender-variance with misery. 
This bias creates a hermeneutical lacuna that prevents easy expression of positive aspects of 
gender variance, and has the potential to cause personal identity-related harm to 
gender-nonconforming children. This likely leaves gender-nonconforming children without the 
hermeneutical resources needed to positively represent their lived experience of gender to others, 
and sometimes even to themselves. Drawing on autobiographical experiences of trans women, 
Fricker and Jenkins showed how coming to an understanding of one’s atypical gender identity 
through the use of negatively-connoted hermeneutical resources can lead to self-hatred and 
134 Kelso, 1073. 
135 Kelso, 1078. 
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long-lasting identity-related harm.  This suggests that cultural availability of only 136
negatively-connoted hermeneutical resources with which to represent atypical gendered 
experiences may be sufficient to induce gender dysphoria in otherwise well-adjusted “gender 
creative” children. Overall, children’s media in the West overwhelmingly reinforce the 
male/female binary and associated stereotypes, at the expense of recognizing other presentations, 
experiences, and identities. 
Wrong Body, Wrong Narrative. 
The most common explanations of trans experience in the media is the wrong body 
narrative.  The ​wrong body narrative​ has long been the prototypical account of trans existence. 137
Originally, this narrative was used by physicians as a gatekeeping mechanism that determined 
who was allowed to access trans-specific medical interventions,  but the trans people desiring 138
treatment were quick to pick up on the standards by which physicians decided who qualified to 
medically transition (and the language used to describe these standards), and deploy their 
knowledge to gain approval for treatment.   139
In addition to being taken up and deployed by trans people within a medical context, the 
wrong body narrative has since been adopted by media outlets as a prototypical account of trans 
experience.  Despite its limitations, trans people portrayed in the media espouse the wrong 140
body narrative both ​explicitly ​in interviews and memoirs, and ​implicitly​ by medical transition. 
Though this may seem to support the explanatory power of the wrong body narrative, it is 
136 Fricker & Jenkins, 275. 
137  Michael Lovelock, “Call Me Caitlyn: Making and Making over the ‘Authentic’ Transgender Body in 
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actually the result of a pattern of testimonial injustice wherein entertainment industry solicits and 
reports autobiographical accounts of trans experience ​only​ when the reported experience 
conforms to a narrow set of expectations. As Fricker and Jenkins observed, “in some cases, trans 
people report being invited to participate in news articles or documentaries only to be dropped 
when it becomes clear that they will not pander to a preconceived narrative.”  This pattern of 141
injustice helps to maintain hermeneutical lacunae that eclipse the complexity and variety of trans 
subjectivities, which in turn leads to hermeneutical injustices when trans people whose lived 
experiences do not align with the wrong body narrative are unable to render their experiences 
culturally intelligible. In addition to the public identity-related harm of having one’s identity 
misunderstood by others, gender-related hermeneutical lacunae can result in personal 
identity-related harms when trans people are unable to render their lived experiences fully 
intelligible to ​themselves​ without using negatively connoted hermeneutical resources.  
Much like the media representations of gender nonconforming youth discussed in the 
previous section, the wrong body narrative emphasizes and normalizes distressing aspects of 
trans existence. The wrong body narrative should be understood to be a negatively connoted 
hermeneutical resource because it makes sense of trans experience through a framework of 
bodily alienation and dysphoria. The wrong body narrative, in conjunction with the limited and 
highly medicalized language culturally available to describe trans experience (discussed in 
Chapter One), precludes the capacity of trans people to positively express their lived experiences 
of gender, thereby committing hermeneutical injustice. In all, even though claiming that trans 
women are simply women born in men’s bodies (and vice-versa for trans men) may provide an 
141 Fricker & Jenkins, 272. 
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easy way for the cisgender majority to conceive of and accept the existence of trans people, this 
rhetoric is over-simplified and undermines the wide variability of lived trans experience. 
Producing (Trans) Women. 
As adults, Americans often find their media consumption saturated with images of the 
“perfect” woman. These images and associated ideals pressure women to transform their own 
bodies to meet an unattainable ideal of femininity. This can cause perpetual feelings of 
inadequacy in women who strive to meet this ideal when it becomes evident that it is impossible. 
The fashion-beauty complex​, coined by Sandra Lee Bartky, comprises the sector of the culture 
industry devoted to cosmetic goods and services; it is the driving force behind the social pressure 
for women to sculpt their bodies into idealized sex objects. Though often damaging to their 
self-esteem, many women happily engage in the alienating behaviors encouraged by the 
fashion-beauty complex.  Bartky used the term ​feminine narcissism ​to refer to the pleasure a 142
woman may feel when viewing her body through the male gaze (i.e. by actively objectifying 
herself).  Cisgender and trans women alike are culprits of feminine narcissism, yet trans women 143
face much harsher criticism for their behaviors. 
In an article about how (sexist) media depictions of femininity are perpetuated through 
trans women, Michael Lovelock argued that both trans and cisgender women are strongly 
pressured to ‘prove’ the authenticity of their gender identity through cosmetic modifications. The 
apparent subscription of trans women to the fashion-beauty complex is largely driven by the 
ubiquity of the wrong body narrative described above. Though this narrative is commonly used 
by the media to explain trans experiences in an easy-to-digest manner, Lovelock identified it as 
142 Sandra Lee Bartky, “Narcissism, Femininity and Alienation,”​ Social Theory and Practice​ 8, no. 2 
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one of the driving factors in the normalization of extensive surgical and cosmetic modifications 
for trans women. In addition to the injustices already described, the wrong body narrative 
problematically implies the existence of a ​right ​body that can be attained through costly cosmetic 
modification.  This idealized body, Lovelock argued, is not only informed by hegemonic 144
femininity, but middle-class, white, and able-bodied ideals as well. But rather than damning trans 
women for perpetuating harmful gender norms, Lovelock acknowledged that trans women 
experience a greater pressure to embody these problematic ideals than their cisgender 
counterparts because “the femininities of transgender women are inherently more unstable, and 
subject to increased contestation.”   145
Unfortunately, not all theorists on this topic treat trans women as sympathetically as 
Lovelock did. In the chapter “We are all Transsexuals Now” from the 2002 book ​Screened Out​, 
Jean Baudrillard claimed that transsexuality is driven by a desire to attain ​the ‘look’​––which he 
defined as an entirely superficial and hyperreal self-presentation that signifies an identity without 
the need for an internal self––and grounds gender nonconformity in eroticism. In many ways, 
Baudrillard’s understanding of the ‘look’ pursued by transsexuals appears to refer to the same 
‘look’ that drives fashion-beauty complex. Despite the compliance of cisgender women with the 
fashion-beauty complex, Baudrillard described “a carnivorous erotic ideology which no woman 
today would sign up to—except, precisely, a transsexual, a transvestite: they alone, as we know, 
live by the exaggerated, carnivorous signs of sexuality.”  This statement reflects beliefs similar 146
to those espoused by trans-exclusionary feminists who decry the gender expression of trans 
144 Lovelock, 676. 
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women as degrading to cis women. Like Baudrillard, this type of feminist is primarily concerned 
with the medical transitions of trans women. Rather than ignoring the existence of trans men, 
however, trans-exclusionary feminists allege that trans men are merely a cover-up for a system 
that was designed to reinforce toxic feminine ideals through trans women.  147
Trans Men in Mass Media. 
Although the majority of discourse surrounding trans experience has historically focused 
on trans women, public focus has recently shifted toward other members of the trans community. 
In the chapter of ​Right to Maim ​titled “Bodies with New Organs,” Jasbir Puar argued that the 
centrality of trans women to trans rights debates has recently been supplanted by the increasing 
visibility of trans men. As she explained on page 42, “the more recently emergent trajectory of 
female-to-male (ftm) enlivened by access to hormones, surgical procedures, and prosthetics [...] 
has centralized a white trans man subject.”  Puar’s account of the shift in focus from trans 148
women to trans men can be seen in current media trends. For instance, a recently released ​Time 
article, ​"How a New Class of Trans Male Actors Are Changing the Face of Television," 
discussed how trans representation on the big and small screens is slowly shifting toward being 
more inclusive of trans men (and nonbinary) actors. Many of the trans actors discussed in this 
article noted that they had been recruited for multiple trans-specific roles (after coming out 
and/or playing a trans character), indicating that a rapidly increasing number of writers and 
producers are seeking to include trans characters in their screenplays. However, as the article 
noted, the existence of inoffensively portrayed trans characters often depends on the contribution 
of a trans person to the character development process. But since there are “too few showrunners 
147 Hausman, 9-10. 
148 Puar, 42. 
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hiring trans writers, whether or not their shows have trans-specific content and characters,” there 
are presently only two trans men who write for the screen, both white.   149
Unfortunately, a shift in focus to (white) trans men is no less problematic than previous 
focus on (white) trans women when it comes to acknowledging the diversity within the trans 
community. Privileging binary (i.e. male or female) white trans experience can lead to feelings 
of isolation and non-belonging for racial and gender minorities within the trans community. For 
example, when Nico Dacumus recounted zir experience in college as a “flaming queer radical 
polysexual two-spirit female-bodied [...] Filipin@/Chican@ antimisogynist transgender butch 
fag,”  ze reported originally feeling as if ze did not belong in the trans community; the trans 150
men with whom the author attended college “us[ed] their transgendered otherness to shield 
themselves from being called out on actions that were racist, classist, or misogynistic.”  In a 151
2017 article, Spencer and Patterson described this particular way of deflecting blame and 
responsibility as ​white witnessing​, defined as “a phenomenon where White queer and trans 
people hold up their victimization by heterosexist and cissexist cultures to disavow their own 
complicity in White supremacy.”  Much like Dacumous reported feeling unwelcome by zir 152
LGBT peers, Spencer and Patterson reported that the more privileged members of their 
149 Trish Bendix, "How a New Class of Trans Male Actors Are Changing the Face of Television,"​ ​Time, 
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University’s LGBTQA club (for which the authors served as faculty advisors) marginalized the 
nonbinary members  and people of color in the group.   153 154
These examples show that acknowledgement and acceptance of white trans men and 
women benefits an already privileged subsection of the trans community. As Puar argued, “the 
post–civil rights era story about the linear progression of the bestowal of rights” painted by the 
culture industry ignores the significance of intersectionality to how these rights are actually 
distributed and thus “with a very partial portrait of who benefits and how” from this bestowal of 
rights.  Though there may be a temptation to think that a third gender would be a victory for all 155
members of the trans community, the potential positive impact of the third new gender will, 
based on Puar’s account, likely be realized by white, capacitated, economically advantaged trans 
and gender-nonconforming people.​ ​In line with this, the current media bias in favor of privileged 
and gender-normative members of the trans community eclipses the wide diversity of individuals 
who consider themselves to be trans, thereby allowing unequal access to rights by certain 
members of the trans community to go unnoticed both by the broader public and by more 
privileged members of the LGBT community. 
Homonormativity and Transnormativity. 
Though some of the most well-loved trans celebrities, such as Laverne Cox, are people of 
color, there is still a media-driven impetus for trans people to conform to a white, middle-class, 
able-bodied, gender-normative standard. As Puar argued, socially-condoned expression of 
gender variance not only requires a stereotypical gender presentation, but “revolves around 
153 Spencer & Patterson, 306-307. 
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rehabilitation to multiple social norms.”  This means that many trans people end up reinforcing 156
not just​ the very binary gender system that betrayed them in the past, ​but also ​other harmful 
social norms about how a person’s body should look. The process of reintegrating LGBT people 
back into a heterosexist society is known as homonormativity. ​Homonormativity​, as defined by 
Spencer and Patterson, is a de-radicalization of LGBT culture that closely conforms to 
gender-normative, capitalist, white-imperialist standards. Homonormativity centers on a white, 
able-bodied, binary-gendered subject who does not challenge the heterosexism inherent in most 
of society. As such, homonormativity disproportionately harms queer people of color and 
nonbinary people of any race.   157
In the chapter “Bodies with New Organs” of ​Right to Maim​, Jasbir Puar discussed the 
ways in which the social acceptance and accommodation of trans bodies is contingent on their 
ability to adhere to capitalist norms of productivity.  Puar uses the term ​transnormative ​to 158
describe the trans people who conform to the white, capacitated, gender-normative standard of 
social acceptability. Transnormativity​ ​is a paradigm through which (some) trans people structure 
their views of themselves, their bodies, and their places in the world. This paradigm allows for a 
view of “the body as endlessly available for hormonal and surgical manipulation and becoming, 
a body producing toward ableist norms,”  thus making the conditions possible for trans piecing 159
(as described in Chapter One) to occur. 
Within a culture of transnormativity, trans people are stereotyped as all wanting to 
transition to the binary gender opposite their assigned sex. Unfortunately, normalizing binary 
156 Puar, 43. 
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transitions both falsely reinforces the male/female sex binary and has the potential to result in 
categorization threat for many non-binary transgender individuals. In order to avoid gender 
categorization threat, according to Clair et al., people must feel both that they have the ​autonomy 
to determine their own gender and that the gender they identify with is seen as ​legitimate​.  160
Since the culture industry generally portrays extensively medicalized, binary transitions as the 
only ‘authentic’ way of being transgender, it is implied (if not explicitly stated) that identities 
outside of the male/female binary are not seen as legitimate options for self-identification. 
Therefore, even when given autonomy to choose which gender they designate, people who do 
not identify within the male/female binary may face categorization threat––and thus 
identity-related harm––when forced to choose between labelling themselves “male” or “female.” 
Normalizing Nonbinary. 
Since the beginning of 2019, a few notable celebrities have come out as identifying with 
a gender outside the male/female binary. In late spring of 2019, Jonathan Van Ness (from the 
popular ​Netflix ​show ​Queer Eye​) publicly claimed a nonbinary identity in an interview with ​The 
Washington Post​.  In the fall of that year, singer Sam Smith announced that they identified as 161
nonbinary and requested that fans refer to them with they/them/theirs pronouns.  As media 162
outlets increasingly encounter and interview people who do not identify within the male/female 
binary, they are slowly beginning to develop a set of norms and expectations for nonbinary 
people. As soon as nonbinary people are identified as such, they are pressured to conform to a 
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narrow view of what it means to be nonbinary. This results in the force-fitting of a diverse 
assortment of gendered subjectivities into a catch-all nonbinary prototype. 
Assuming Pronoun Preferences. 
In January 2020, singer Janelle Monáe retweeted a statement that stood in solidarity with 
the nonbinary community, but was misinterpreted by media outlets as a coming out statement. 
Immediately following its posting, several articles were posted about Monáe that, in addition to 
misinterpreting her intention behind the retweet, perpetuated a variety of potentially harmful 
misconceptions about what it means to be nonbinary.  A particularly clear example of 163
media-perpetuated misconceptions about nonbinary can be seen in ​The Guardian​’s claim 
(despite there being no mention of pronouns in Monáe’s tweet) that: “Janelle Monáe just came 
out as non-binary, joining a growing number of people who use ‘they/them’ as pronouns.”  164
Since Monáe never requested they/them/theirs pronouns, this statement is evidence of an 
increasingly emerging norm that nonbinary people all use they/them/theirs pronouns.​ ​As 
journalist Vic Parsons​ ​aptly noted in a ​PinkNews​ article about the media attention given to 
Monáe’s tweet: “Non-binary people use the pronouns that make them feel most comfortable. For 
some, that’s they/them, and for others, it isn’t.”   165
“Gender-Neutral” Emoji. 
In addition to the development of a prototypical preferred set of pronouns, increasing 
cultural-focus on nonbinary individuals has also led to the development of hermeneutical 
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resources––in the form of emoji––that establish a prototypical nonbinary gender expression. 
These emoji portray a third gender that falls neatly between male and female, a representation 
that has had a mixed reception. As Paige Leskin reported with ​Business Insider​: “The third 
‘gender neutral’ option for each human emoji is meant to appear more gender-inclusive and 
androgynous, with hair that falls above the shoulders and an outfit that's gray rather than the 
gender-signaling purple-clad female and blue-wearing male icons.”  Leskin goes on to claim 166
that Apple’s release of gender-neutral emoji is praised by the LGBT community, with many 
members “who say they're happy to have an emoji that looks more like them.”   167
However, not all in the LGBT community find these emoji to be sufficiently inclusive; as 
journalist Lux Alptraum noted, although the available “gender-neutral” emoji certainly provide 
validation to some users, they also ignore and invalidate the experiences of others. Alptraum 
argued that the decisions Apple made when designing gender-neutral emoji “ultimately reinforce 
some harmful ideas about what it means to be ‘gender-neutral’ that can leave many people 
feeling erased and ignored even as their identity is supposedly made more visible.”   168
The stereotyping of nonbinary gender identities described above suggests that the 
(formerly transgressive and always highly individual) experience of identifying outside the 
male/female binary has been deradicalized to the point where it can be profitably deployed by 
the culture industry. At the same time as a third categorical gender (and associated emoji) brings 
recognition to ​some​ long-ignored gender minorities, it ignores, rejects, and invalidates the 
gendered experiences of many others in line with already existing hermeneutical lacunae. 
166 Leskin. 
167 Leskin. 
168 Lux Alptraum, “Apple’s Gender-Neutral Emojis Aren’t for Everyone,” OneZero, October 30, 2019, 
https://onezero.medium.com/apples-gender-neutral-emojis-aren-t-for-everyone-17c6269c5a95  
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Summary. 
In this chapter, I provided numerous examples of the harms and injustices caused by the 
culture industry’s reliance on the male/female binary, and explored how effectively they can be 
redressed by adopting the male/female/nonbinary ternary. I additionally introduced the emerging 
media prototype of a nonbinary person, and argued on the basis of nonbinary stereotypes in mass 
media that all identities outside of the male/female binary have been collapsed into the 
supposedly one-size-fits-all third gender marker that is “nonbinary.”  
On a positive note, the emergence of a third gender into the public eye has brought with it 
a variety of hermeneutical resources to describe experiences of gender that could not be made 
intelligible through the language of medicine alone. Minority gender subjectivities can now be 
acknowledged using the gender-neutral honorific Mx.,  they/them/theirs pronouns,  and/or the 169 170
many other third-gendered and gender-neutral language options now available to describe 
experiences outside the male/female binary.  Since the proliferation of these hermeneutical 171
resources is incredibly beneficial to many members of the LGBT community, it can be easy to 
forget those who are left behind. Overall, the uptake of a “nonbinary” gender category (and 
associated language) by mass media does not address––and may even ​reinforce​––the 
hermeneutical lacunae that obscure fluid, contextually contingent, and idiosyncratic aspects of 
gendered experience.  
  
169 ​Merriam-Webster​, s.v. “Mx.,” accessed April 28, 2020, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Mx​.  
170  Merriam-Webster, s.v. “They,” accessed April 28, 2020, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/they  
171 Miriam Berger, “A guide to how gender-neutral language is developing around the world,” The 
Washington Post, December 15, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/15/guide-how-gender- 
neutral-language-is-developing-around-world/  
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Conclusion 
As argued in this thesis, the gender-related hermeneutical resources produced and 
controlled by medicine and the culture industry privilege certain trans narratives at the expense 
of others. Chapter One discussed the ways medicine continues to surgically, hormonally, and 
narratively sustain the male/female binary despite evidence that these practices cause 
identity-related harm to intersex people. Chapter One additionally demonstrated that the 
reification of cultural norms, such as gender constancy, within the medical domain is particularly 
harmful because medicine operates under a guise of objectivity that lends undue credibility to the 
norms it perpetuates. Medical discourse contributes many (if not most) of the hermeneutical 
resources culturally available to describe gender, which means that the widespread introduction 
of a “nonbinary” category into medical research and treatment protocols is likely to cause a 
proliferation of new hermeneutical resources that will provide the means to better linguistically 
represent nonbinary gender identification. Though this will extend hermeneutical justice to many 
members of the trans community, it will still continue to perpetuate hermeneutical injustice faced 
by people with fluid experiences of gender, as well as other gender minorities that do not identify 
with an androgynous third gender category. 
Chapter Two delineated the ways the culture industry structures lived experience by 
classifying humanity into discrete groups. Though the culture industry does not claim objectivity, 
those who work within it often profess innocence when accused of creating and perpetuating 
harmful gender norms. Operating on the claim that they are ​responding ​to already existing 
differences, producers of children's media and toys continue to inundate the next generation with 
restrictive gender norms. Into adulthood, the entertainment media consumed by Americans 
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continues to perpetuate unattainable gender ideals and stereotypes that harm cis and trans people 
alike. As argued at the end of Chapter Two, the rise in media recognition of “nonbinary” as a 
third gender has already led to the development of a nonbinary media prototype that requires 
androgynous presentation and use of they/them/theirs pronouns as a precondition for respect and 
recognition as nonbinary. Although this recognition is beneficial for many who identify as 
androgynous, it ignores the identities of people who fall outside the male/female binary but do 
not fit neatly into the emerging third gender category. 
In all, a third gender does not offer a solution to many of the problems caused by 
compulsory binary gendering. In fact, belief that a nonbinary categorical gender accounts for 
everyone who falls outside the male/female binary may even ​strengthen​ the hermeneutical 
lacunae that obstruct atypical gender experiences from cultural intelligibly. Although the 
discourse generated from the increasing recognition of nonbinary people has undoubtedly 
already had a positive impact on some people in the trans community, it will likely continue to 
obscure the lived experiences of many others for as long as “nonbinary” discursively designates 
a discrete third gender.  
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